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How does political preference affect categorization in the political domain? Eight 
studies demonstrate that people on both ends of the political spectrum—strong 
Republicans and strong Democrats—form simpler and more clustered categories of 
political stimuli than do moderates and neutrals. This pattern was obtained regardless 
of whether stimuli were politicians (Study 1), social groups (Study 2), or newspapers 
(Study 3). Furthermore, both strong Republicans and strong Democrats were more 
likely to make inferences about the world based on their clustered categorization. This 
was found for estimating the likelihood that geographical location determines voting 
(Study 4), that political preference determines personal taste (Study 5), and that social 
relationships determine political preference (Study 6). The effect is amplified if 
political ideology is salient (Study 7) and remains after controlling for differences in 
political sophistication (Study 8). The political domain appears simpler to the 
politically extreme than to political moderates. 
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The Political Domain Appears Simpler to the Politically Extreme than to Political 
Moderates 
America is more politically polarized today than it has been for generations (Haidt, 
2012; Layman & Carsey, 2002). Partisanship has increased not only among 
politicians, but also among the electorate (Brewer, 2005; McCarthy, Poole, & 
Rosenthal, 2006). Increasing political divisions have important psychological 
consequences. For example, people at the political extremes are more intolerant and 
more inclined to believe their attitudes to be superior than are moderates (Brandt, 
Reyna, Chambers, Crawford, & Wetherell, 2014; Toner, Leary, Asher, & Jongman-
Sereno, 2013). People with a strong political preference also perceive the nation to be 
more polarized than do people with a more moderate political opinion (Van Boven, 
Judd, & Sherman, 2012; Westfall, Van Boven, Chambers, & Judd, 2015). But in the 
current work we aim to show that a strong political preference may have even more 
fundamental effects: political extremity can shape the way people categorize the 
political domain. We aim to show that those at the political extremes categorize 
political reality more strongly, forming more tightly defined, homogeneous, and 
clustered categories, compared to moderates, who see more shades of grey.  
Political Preference and Representation of Political Stimuli 
This idea derives from the notion that what people see and perceive is not 
solely a function of objective reality, but rather results from an active cognitive 
process of representation (Bruner, 1957). People categorize the 52 unique elements of 
a deck of cards into four suits. By reducing the complexity of the deck to four clusters 
of cards with a similar color, people can more effectively use their limited mental 
capacities to win the game (Bruner & Postman, 1949). What is true for playing cards 
is true for reality in general. Categorization reduces reality to clusters and categories, 
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which allows people to deal with the world more effectively by simplifying an 
abundance of stimuli (Allport, 1954; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). When formulating our 
hypotheses on how political preference relates to categorization of the political 
domain, we noted two opposing hypotheses on that relation:  
Rigidity-of-the-Right. First, according to the rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis, 
strong conservatives tend to perceive reality in more rigid and sharply defined 
categories, whereas others, including strong liberals, engage in more nuanced thinking 
(Altemeyer, 1998; Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949). A wealth of research has supported this 
hypothesis, by demonstrating that conservatives are less tolerant of ambiguity and 
have higher needs for structure and order (Chirumbolo, 2002; Jost, Glaser, 
Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Jost et al., 2007; Kirton, 1978; Sidanius, 1978; Van 
Hiel, Pandelaere & Duriez, 2004; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Given that people 
with a reduced tolerance for ambiguity and an increased need for structure tend to 
perceive more within-category similarity and between-category dissimilarity (Ames, 
2004; Krueger & Rothbart, 1990; Moskowitz, 1993; Nosofsky, 1987; Tenenbaum & 
Griffiths, 2001), it can be hypothesized that conservatives form more rigid and 
sharply defined categories. This rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis therefore predicts an 
asymmetric effect: strong conservatives will categorize more sharply than 
moderates—but strong liberals will not.   
Ideological Extremity. In contrast, the ideological extremity hypothesis holds 
that people on both political extremes—strong conservatives and strong liberals—
categorize the political domain more sharply. This idea follows from work that shows 
that the psychological processes underlying political extremism are largely the same 
on both sides of the political continuum (Brandt et al., 2014; Rokeach, 1956; Tetlock, 
1984). Indeed, emerging findings show that extremists on both sides are more 
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dogmatic and less complex (Conway et al., 2016), and are more likely to believe in 
overly simplistic conspiracy theories (Van Prooijen, Krouwel, & Pollet, 2015). One 
factor that may explain such effects is a more categorical and sharply defined mental 
representation of the political domain. After all, categorization helps people not only 
to simplify the environment, but also to structure the environment according to 
dimensions that are personally relevant for them (Nosofsky, 1987; Nosofsky, Clark, 
& Shin, 1989; Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963). Just as people with an extreme position on the 
issue of race—racists—spontaneously use racial dimensions more in structuring 
stimuli, producing homogeneous categories of whites and blacks (Pattyn, Rosseel, & 
Van Hiel, 2012; Stangor, Lynch, Duan, & Glas, 1992), people with an extreme 
political position can be expected to spontaneously use the political-ideological 
dimension. This ideological rigidity hypothesis therefore predicts a symmetric effect: 
strong conservatives and strong liberals will categorize political stimuli more sharply, 
compared to neutrals and moderates.   
Current Approach 
In summary, two hypotheses make different predictions regarding how 
people’s political preference relates to their categorization of political stimuli. The 
current work tests these hypotheses against each other. We propose that one important 
reason why literature supports two different predictions is that the dominant approach 
for testing the relation between ideology and cognition has been to measure 
participants’ agreement or disagreement with series of statements. One 
methodological problem of this approach is that it assumes that researchers can 
correctly identify those items that, in measuring participants’ agreement versus 
disagreement with them, best capture the variable of interest (Brunswik, 1955; 
Fiedler, 2011). Emerging findings show that those assumptions are problematic. 
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Small changes to the selection of dependent measures can lead to radically different 
conclusions about the relation between political preference and cognition (Brandt et 
al., 2014; Conway et al., 2016).    
We therefore use objective stimuli selection methods. For example, in Study 
1, where we focus on the categorization of politicians, we use the most commonly 
known US politicians as stimuli, based on pilot testing. Furthermore, to avoid 
restraining participants’ responses to mere agreement or disagreement, in the first 
three studies we use a two-dimensional sorting paradigm that measures categorization 
without any top-down assumptions (Hout, Goldinger, & Ferguson, 2013; Koch, 
Alves, Krüger, & Unkelbach, 2016; Koch, Imhoff, Dotsch, Unkelbach, & Alves, 
2016; Unkelbach, Fiedler, Bayer, Stegmüller, & Danner, 2008). In the latter five 
studies we measure categorization by testing perceptions of probabilities, which only 
requires the assumption that people’s probabilistic inferences depends on their mental 
representation of reality (Anderson, 1991; Fiedler, 1996; Tversky, 1977; Tversky & 
Gati, 1982).  
Political Sophistication and Knowledge 
One important possible alternative explanation of the here-hypothesized effect 
is that those on the extremes of the political continuum are sometimes found to have 
greater political knowledge and sophistication (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; 
Federico & Hunt, 2013; Palfrey & Poole, 1987; Sidanius, 1984, 1988; Sidanius 1984; 
1988; Sidanius & Lau, 1989; Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2003; Zaller, 1992). Therefore, 
any effect of extremity on categorization may be due to their greater ability to 
correctly sort stimuli according to ideology. Therefore, we use a variety of different 
approaches to rule out this alternative explanation, throughout these studies. We 
briefly discuss them in each study and return to this issue in the General Discussion. 
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Summary 
We tested how differences in political ideology relate to differences in the 
categorization of political stimuli, using eight studies, in which we use two 
approaches: a sorting paradigm (Studies 1-3) and a measurement of probabilistic 
inferences (Studies 4-8). Throughout these studies, we measured political ideology on 
a scale between Strongly Democrat (1) and Strongly Republican (5), with Neutral (3), 
Moderate Democrat (2), and Moderate Republican (4) in the middle. The rigidity-of-
the-right hypothesis predicts a positive linear effect of political preference on 
categorization strength, such that as people move from Strongly Democrat to Strongly 
Republican, they represent political stimuli more sharply along political lines, 
forming denser and more homogeneous clusters; conversely, the ideological extremity 
hypothesis predicts a U-shaped quadratic effect, such that people on both ends of the 
political extremes categorize more strongly, compared to moderates.  
In the main text, we only discuss essentials of the study. Each study is 
discussed in detail in the SOM, including discussion on sample size. We did not 
exclude any data, we report all measures, and we include a meta-analysis to avoid any 
file-drawer effect. 
Study 1 – Politicians in the Arena 
Participants were asked to spatially arrange the names of politicians, placing 
similar politicians closer together and dissimilar politicians wider apart. Simpler 
categorization occurs as participants place exemplars of the same category together in 
dense clusters and further away from exemplars of a different category. 
Method 
 Participants and Design. Participants were 114 American MTurk users (42 
women, 72 men; Mage= 36.1 years) who participated for $1.  
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Procedure and Measures. Participants were presented with the names of 10 
U.S. American Democrat politicians (e.g. Bill Clinton) and 10 Republican (Sarah 
Palin) politicians. A pilot test confirmed that most participants (78%) could correctly 
identify all, or all but one of the politicians correctly (M= 18.74, SD= 2.28). This is 
important to rule out that effects are driven by differences in political sophistication. 
Participants were instructed to sort politicians’ names ‘according to your own 
feeling of how similar or dissimilar these people are’, by dragging and dropping 
similar politicians closer together and dissimilar politicians wider apart on the screen. 
Participants were free to change the position of any stimulus at any time. After 
completing the spatial sorting task, participants indicated their political preference.  
Results 
We operationalized sharpness of categorization by dividing the average 
intraclass difference (e.g., Obama-Pelosi) by the average interclass difference (e.g., 
Obama-Palin) and subtracted this from 1 (Hout et al., 2013; Unkelbach et al., 2008). 
This index approaches 1 if participants fully follow categories in their sorting and 
approaches 0 if they abandon categories completely. Next, in this and all subsequent 
studies, we used hierarchical polynomial regression analysis, to test the effect of 
political preference on sharpness of categorization.  
Contrary to the rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis, we found no significant linear 
effect on categorization, B= -0.01, SE= 0.02, CI95% [-0.05; +0.04], Beta= -0.03, F(1, 
111)= 0.10, p= .76, R2= .001, but, consistent with the ideological extremity 
hypothesis, a positive U-shaped quadratic effect emerged, B= 0.09, SE= 0.02, CI95% 
[+0.05; +0.13], Beta= 0.46, ΔF(1, 111)= 21.79, p< .0001, ΔR2= .16. Both strong 
Democrats (M= 0.64, SD= 0.17) and strong Republicans (M= 0.61, SD= 0.16) formed 
more homogeneous and clustered categories than neutrals (M= 0.31, SD= 0.24), 




Figure 1. Results of Studies 1 – 6: Strength of categorization among Strong 
Democrats, Moderates, Neutrals, and Strong Republicans. Higher scores indicate a 
politically more homogeneous mental representation (Studies 1-3) and stronger 
inferences drawn from these representations (Studies 4-6). All dependent measures 
were rescaled from 0 to 1. For example, scores on a 7-point scale were rescaled so 























Study 1: Politicians, p < .0001
Study 5: Taste, p = .068
Study 6: Social Relations, p = .002
Study 4: Voting behavior, p = .002
Study 3: Newspapers, p = .02
Study 2: Social Groups, p = .02






Figure 2A, 2B. Study 1: 2D scaling of the average similarity proximities of US 
politicians for strong Republicans/ strong Democrats (Figure 2A) and for neutrals 
(Figure 2B). Moderate Republicans/ moderate Democrats scored in the middle (not 
shown).  
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 moderate Democrats (M= 0.48, SD= 0.21), or moderate Republicans (M= 0.56, SD= 
0.21). Figure 1 shows averaged results across the first six studies. Figure 2 presents 
how strong Democrats/ strong Republicans (Figure 2A) and how neutrals (Figure 2B) 
sorted the stimuli on average. Note that those on the extremes formed denser clusters 
that are wider apart, compared to neutrals. 
Study 2 – Social Groups in Society 
To generalize our findings, Study 2 focused on categorization of social groups 
in society, stereotypically associated as either liberal or conservative.  
Method 
 Participants and Design. Participants were 202 American MTurk users (91 
women, 111 men; Mage= 32.3 years) who participated for $1.  
Procedure and Measures. The procedure was highly similar to that of Study 
1. Participants were asked to spatially arrange the names of 6 stereotypically liberal 
(e.g., Feminists) and 6 conservative (e.g. businesspeople) social groups. This selection 
follows Chambers, Schlenker, and Collisson (2013), who found that these groups’ 
political stereotypes are commonly known, which is important to rule out that effects 
are driven by differences in political sophistication. Participants were instructed to 
follow their own feelings about the groups’ (dis)similarity. 
Results 
As in Study 1, we found no significant linear effect of political preference on 
categorization, B= 0.01, SE= 0.01, CI95% [-0.02; +0.03], Beta= 0.05, F(1, 200)= 
0.47, p= .50, R2= .002, but instead a significant quadratic effect, B= 0.03, SE= 0.01, 
CI95% [+0.004; +0.05], Beta= 0.16, ΔF(1, 199)= 5.22, p= .02, ΔR2= .03. See Figure 
1. Both strong Democrats (M= 0.26, SD= 0.17) and strong Republicans (M= 0.31, 
SD= 0.21) categorized social groups more strongly according to their political 






Figure 3A, 3B. Study 2: 2D scaling of the average similarity proximities of social 
groups for strong Republicans/ strong Democrats (Figure 2A) and for neutrals (Figure 
2B). Moderate Republicans/ moderate Democrats scored in the middle (not shown).  
Political Preference and Representation of the Political Domain 13 
 
ideology, than neutrals (M= 0.21, SD= 0.20), moderate Democrats (M= 0.21, SD= 
0.19), and moderate Republicans (M= 0.23, SD= 0.14). Figure 3 presents how strong 
Democrats/ strong Republicans (Figure 3A) and how neutrals (Figure 3B) sorted 
stimuli on average. 
Study 3 - Newspapers 
In Study 3 we focus on how people represent stimuli related to the media. To 
help rule out the effect of political sophistication, we computed degree of clustering 
using participants’ subjective, rather than objective, classification, thus bypassing any 
effects of differences in political sophistication—allowing us to further rule out that 
concern.  
Method 
Participants and Design. Participants were 300 American MTurk users (131 
women, 169 men; Mage= 34.2 years) who participated for $1.  
Procedure and Measures. Participants spatially ordered the names of 10 
liberal (e.g., New York Times) and 10 conservative newspapers (e.g. Wall-Street 
Journal) (Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2010), following their own feelings about their  
(dis)similarity. Afterwards, participants indicated for each newspaper whether they 
thought it is liberal or conservative. Participants were largely unable to accurately 
classify the correct political background of most newspapers and incorrectly classified 
five newspapers on average (M= 15.00, SD= 3.03). We instead computed the 
categorization score using an ideographic classification score, based on participants’ 
subjective classification of each stimulus, rather than objective classification, as in 
previous studies.  
Results 
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As in prior studies, we found no linear effect of political preference on 
categorization, B= 0.02, SE= 0.01, CI95% [-0.01; +0.05], Beta= 0.08, F(1, 298)= 
1.87, p=.17, ΔR2=.006, but a significant U-shaped quadratic effect, B= 0.04, SE= 
0.02, CI95% [+0.01; +0.07], Beta= 0.14, ΔF(1, 297)= 5.53, p=.025, ΔR2=.02. See 
Figure 1. Both strong Democrats (M= 0.30, SD= 0.27) and strong Republicans (M= 
0.33, SD= 0.28) categorized newspapers more into two homogeneous and non-
overlapping clusters, compared to neutrals (M= 0.22, SD= 0.22), moderate Democrats 
(M= 0.21, SD= 0.23), and moderate Republicans (M= 0.28, SD= 0.28).  
Study 4 – Elections Results 
Whereas the first studies examined categorization directly, the next studies 
focused on perceptions of probabilities. Study 4 examined people’s perceptions of 
election results, by asking them to guess the 2012 Presidential election results of 
traditionally red and blue states. If people on the political extremes categorize more 
strongly, then they will perceive the United States as consisting of two sharply 
defined Red and Blue parts and will therefore overestimate the support for the winner 
in each state. As such, categorization can lead to distortion and exaggeration. This is 
important, because it allows further disentangling of categorization (which reduces 
accuracy; Allport, 1954; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990) and sophistication (which increases 
accuracy). 
Method 
Participants and Design. Participants were 300 American MTurk users (102 
women, 198 men; Mage= 31.1 years) who participated for a payment of $0.30.  
 Procedure and Measures. Participants estimated the percentage of people 
who voted for Obama versus for Romney (between 0 and 100%) in the 2012 
Presidential Elections, in each of 16 traditionally red (e.g. Utah) and blue (Hawaii) 
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states. In reality, 63% of the votes in these states went to the local majority candidate, 
on average. Sharpness of clustering was operationalized as participants’ predicted 
likelihood that people voted for the majority candidate within that state (i.e. we used 
raw voting outcomes in the states that Obama won and 100 minus this response in the 
states that Romney won).  
Results 
As in prior studies, we found no linear effect of political preference, B= -0.86, 
SE= 0.53, CI95% [-1.90; +0.17], Beta= -0.09, F(1, 298)= 2.70, p= .10, R2= .01, but 
found a quadratic effect, B= 1.38, SE= 0.44, CI95% [+0.51; +2.25], Beta= 0.18, ΔF(1, 
297)= 9.80, P= .002, ΔR2= .02. See Figure 1. Both strong Democrats (M= 68%, SD= 
9) and strong Republicans (M= 66%, SD= 9) were more influenced by red-blue 
categorizing in their probability estimates, than neutrals (M= 62%, SD= 9). Moderate 
Democrats (M= 65%, SD= 9) and moderate Republicans (M= 66%, SD= 8) scored in 
the middle, albeit closer to their extreme co-partisans than in other studies.  
Importantly, note that the average election voting likelihood estimates 
provided by neutrals were closest to the actual results of the 2012 elections, collapsed 
across states (63%), whereas those provided by strong Democrats and strong 
Republicans were least accurate. This argues against an explanation that people with a 
strong political preference categorize more strongly because of greater knowledge, 
because that would have produced more accurate responses among the extremes. 
Study 5 – Personal Taste 
In Study 5 we test how political opinion relates to beliefs about the likelihood 
that people from different political backgrounds share personal taste. Given that 
sorting on this task does not require much sophistication, this can further rule out the 
potential confounding effect of political knowledge. 




 Participants and Design. Participants were 301 U.S. American Amazon 
Mechanical Turk users (107 women, 194 men; Mage= 32.2 years) who participated for 
$0.25.  
 Procedure and Measures. Participants completed a series of 12 questions 
regarding the likelihood that people with opposite political preferences shared the 
same taste in comedians, movies, books, talk shows, newspapers, and actors, between 
very unlikely (1), undecided (3), and very likely (5). Higher scores suggest stronger 
categorization.  
Results 
Different than in previous studies, we did find a linear effect of political 
preference, B= -0.07, SE= 0.04, CI95% [-0.14; -0.001], Beta= -0.11, F(1, 299)= 3.93, 
p= .05, R2= .01, but its direction was opposite to the rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis 
prediction. More importantly, as in Studies 1 - 4, there was a U-shaped quadratic 
effect, B= 0.05, SE= 0.03, CI95% [-0.00; +0.11], Beta= 0.11, ΔF(1, 298)= 3.36, p= 
.068, ΔR2= .01. See Figure 1. Strong Democrats (M= 3.27, SD= 0.58) and strong 
Republicans (M= 3.25, SD= 0.61) were more influenced by categorizing in their 
estimations, than neutrals (M= 2.97, SD= 0.69) and moderates (MDem= 3.19, SD= 
0.58; MRep= 3.07, SD= 0.54), 
Study 6 – Social Relations 
Study 6 examined similar political clustering at an even more intimate level of 
social relations by looking at family and friend relationship. As in Study 5, the fact 
that these results do not depend on political sophistication can help rule out that 
potential confound. 
Method 
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Participants and Design. Participants were 300 American MTurk users (102 
women, 198 men; mean age 33.3 years) who participated for $0.25.  
Procedures and Measures. Participants indicated the likelihood that people 
within the same social circle (siblings, spouses, friends) have similar political 
opinions, between very unlikely (1) to very likely (5), with higher scores suggesting 
stronger categorization.  
Results 
As in previous studies, there was no significant linear effect, B= -0.04, SE= 
0.02, CI95% [-0.08; +0.01], Beta= -0.09, F(1, 298)= 2.53, p= 0.11, R2= 0.008, but a 
significant U-shaped quadratic effect, B= 0.06, SE= 0.02, CI95% [+0.02; +0.10], 
Beta= 0.18, ΔF(1, 297)= 9.84, p= 0.002, ΔR2= 0.03. Strong Republicans (M= 3.78, 
SD= 0.47) and strong Democrats (M= 3.94, SD= 0.41) categorized more strongly than 
neutrals (M= 3.59, SD= 0.45) and moderates (MDem= 3.69, SD= 0.34; MRep= 3.53, 
SD= 0.35). See Figure 1.  
Study 7 – Salience of Political Preference 
Across the past six studies we observed that people with an extreme political 
opinion are more inclined to spontaneously use political ideology to categorize 
stimuli. Of course the correlational nature of these findings prevents strong claims 
about causality. To provide some indication of causality, Study 7 test whether this 
pattern is amplified if people’s existing political preference is made salient 
beforehand, making the use of ideology as a category to sort stimuli even likelier. 
Furthermore, given that salience should not affect political knowledge, this can 
further rule out its possible confounding effect.  
Method 
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Participants and Design. Participants were 483 American Mturk users (190 
women, 293 men; mean age 33.0 years) who participated for $0.25. Participants were 
randomly allocated to the Increased Salience or Control condition. 
 Procedures and Measures. Different than in previous studies, we measured 
political preference before administering the dependent measures. Next, participants 
in the Increased Salience condition were asked to describe what their political 
preference means for them, while Control participants described what happened 
yesterday. Next, all participants completed the same items as in Study 6. 
Results 
We present here only the critical results; full results are in the SOM. In Step 1 we 
found no evidence for any linear effects of political preference or its interaction with 
condition, on categorization, F(3, 478)= 1.87 p= .13, R2= 0.012. But as predicted, 
when we added the quadratic components in Step 2, we found evidence for a 
quadratic effect on the sharpness of clustering, ΔF(2, 476)= 11.43, p< .001, ΔR2= 
0.05. Specifically, we found a marginal quadratic effect of political preference, B= 
0.05, SE= 0.03, 95%CI [-0.002; +0.097], β= 0.12 t(476)= 1.89, p= .059, qualified by 
an interaction with condition, B= 0.07, SE= 0.04, 95%CI [-0.005; +0.136], β= 0.14 
t(476)= 1.82, p= .069. To interpret this interaction, we ran two separate polynomial 
regression analyses. In the Control condition, we only found a modest U-shaped 
quadratic effect, B= 0.05, SE= 0.03, 95%CI [-0.003; +0.098], β= 0.12, ΔF(1, 238)= 
3.47, p= .064, ΔR2= 0.01. This effect was dwarfed by the highly significant quadratic 
effect in the Increased Salience condition, B= 0.11, SE= 0.03, 95%CI [+0.063; 
+0.163], β= 0.28, ΔF(1, 238)= 19.90, p< .0001, ΔR2= 0.08. 
 




Figure 4. Results of Study 7: a strong political preference is associated with more 
strongly clustered categorizing, especially if that preference is salient (uninterrupted 
line), compared to when it is non-salient (dashed line). Theoretical ranges from 0 to 1. 
P-values test the Quadratic parameter. 
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Increased Salience, p < .0001
Control, p = .064
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Study 8 – Controlling for Political Sophistication 
Throughout the previous studies, we have used a wide variety of ways to 
minimize the effect of political sophistication. In Study 8 we directly measure 
differences in political sophistication, to statistically control for them. We use the 
same design as in Study 6. 
Method 
Participants and Design. Participants were 302 American Mturk users (134 
women, 168 men; mean age 33.0 years) who participated for $0.50.  
 Procedures and Measures. Our design was identical to Study 6, except for 
adding a 25-item multiple-choice political knowledge measure, based on Jordan 
(1999). All participants completed the same dependent measures as in Study 6. See 
the SOM for details and results of the political knowledge measure. 
Results 
As in Study 6, there was a significant negative linear effect, B= -0.06, SE= 
0.02, CI95% [-0.10; -0.01], Beta= -0.13, F(1, 300)= 5.46, p= 0.02, R2= 0.015, 
opposite to the rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis, and a significant U-shaped quadratic 
effect, B= 0.08, SE= 0.02, CI95% [+0.03; +0.12], Beta= 0.20, ΔF(1, 299)= 12.31, p< 
0.001, ΔR2= 0.04. The likelihood estimates of both strong Republicans (M= 3.74, 
SD= 0.58) and strong Democrats (M= 3.82, SD= 0.41) were more influenced by 
political categories than those of neutrals (M= 3.52, SD= 0.43) and moderates (MDem= 
3.65, SD= 0.39; MRep= 3.59, SD= 0.33). Crucially, this U-shaped quadratic effect 
remained significant after controlling for sophistication, B= 0.05, SE= 0.02, CI95% 
[+0.01; +0.09], Beta= 0.14, p= 0.013, even though there was a significant effect of 
sophistication, B= 0.03, SE= 0.01, CI95% [+0.02; +0.04], Beta= 0.29, p< 0.001. 
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Meta-analysis 
To avoid a file-drawer effect, we conducted a meta-analysis across all studies, 
including two studies that failed to show the expected effect (Cumming, 2014). Study 
9 was similar to Study 2, but included more items. Here, the test of the quadratic 
effect showed a non-significant trend in the predicted direction, p= .166. Study 10 
was similar to Studies 1 and 2, but used movie actors as stimuli. It failed to find any 
effect (quadratic trend, p= .95). Inspection of the patterns showed that participants 
instead clustered stimuli according to type of movie (comedy, war, etc.). This shows a 
clear limit to the current effects—a readily available other dimension overwrites the 
effect. The SOM discusses both studies in detail. These are all the studies we 
conducted for this project. To provide a conservative test, we only included the 
control condition of Study 7.   
We combined all data (N= 2,573, standardized within each study). A 
polynomial hierarchical regression showed a weak negative linear effect of political 
ideology on this combined variable, B= -0.04, SE= 0.02, 95%CI [-0.08; -0.00], β= -
0.04, F(1, 2571)= 3.99, p= .046, R2= 0.002, with its direction opposite to the rigidity-
of-the-right hypothesis, and a significant curvilinear effect, B= 0.12, SE= 0.02, 95%CI 
[+0.08; +0.15], β= 0.14, ΔF(1, 2570)= 45.72, p< .0001, ΔR2= 0.02.  
General Discussion 
People on both political extremes categorize stimuli in the political domain 
more strongly than do moderates. They are more likely to cluster similar political 
stimuli closer together and form tighter, more homogeneous categories. This applies 
to a wide range of political stimuli, such as politicians (Study 1), groups associated 
with different ideologies (Study 2), or newspapers (Study 3), and also applies to the 
inferences that people make about politics—for example, how people vote across the 
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country (Study 4), and whether politically different people share personal tastes 
(Study 5), or social relationships (Study 6-8).  
The current work extends beyond existing work by its basic nature. Earlier 
research shows that people on the political extremes exaggerate differences across the 
political divide, see greater polarization in their opponents’ attitudes, and are more 
dogmatic (Conway et al., 2016; Graham, Nosek, & Haidt, 2012; Van Boven et al., 
2012; Westfall et al., 2015). The current findings fit with that literature, but go 
beyond it by showing that people with strong political opinions not only have more 
extreme views, but even represent the political domain differently. They categorize 
the same stimuli differently and perceive more homogeneous and separate categories, 
than do moderates and neutrals.  
As such, the current findings provide an unmotivated and purely perceptual 
explanation of many effects observed in political psychology. For example, the 
finding that those on the extremes have a more extreme opinion (ibid.) can be 
explained with the notion that strong categorization leads to larger perceived between-
category differences (Krueger & Rothbart, 1990; Nosofsky, 1987). People with a 
strong political preference tend to engage in more biased information processing 
(Bartels, 2002; Taber & Lodge, 2006; Taber, Cann, & Kucsova, 2009; Westen, 
Blagov, Harenski, Kilts, & Hamann, 2006). This can be explained with the notion that 
categorization helps to process information more selectively (Bruner & Postman, 
1949; Hamilton & Gifford, 1976). As a third example, people with a strong political 
preference see their opponents as more ideology-driven (Chambers, Baron, & Inman, 
2006; Chambers & Malnyk, 2006; Robinson, Keltner, Ward, & Ross, 1995). This fits 
with our findings, because people who categorize strongly assimilate more strongly 
across same-category stimuli (Ames, 2004; Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 2001). 
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Political Sophistication and Other Limitations 
Across these studies, we used various approaches to rule-out the alternative 
explanation that these effects are driven by greater political knowledge and 
sophistication among those at the political extremes. First, we used stimuli that do not 
require sophistication but are instead easy to sort according to political ideology. For 
example, in Study 1 we used pilot testing to confirm that all participants were able to 
categorize the used stimuli correctly. Second, in Study 3 we measured categorization 
according to participants’ ideographic beliefs about stimuli’s political nature, rather 
than their objective ideological nature, thus bypassing any effect of sophistication. 
Third, in Study 4 we compared categorization strength and accuracy and found that 
stronger categorization shown by participants on the political extremes resulted in less 
accurate perception, compared to moderates, thus arguing against an explanation 
based on them being more knowledgeable. Fourth, in Study 7 we found that 
experimentally increasing the salience of political ideology boosted the effect, which 
argues against the alternative explanation, because sophistication should not be 
affected by salience. Fifth, in Study 8 we directly measured differences in political 
knowledge and found that the quadratic effect remained significant after controlling 
for them. In summary, although results of individual studies may be vulnerable to an 
explanation based on political sophistication, together these studies solve that 
problem.  
The methodological diversity of these studies also solves other possible 
concerns and confounds. For example, although the results of Study 6 may be 
explained by the notion that people with a strong political identity live in objectively 
more homogeneous social environments (Motyl, 2014; Schulz-Herzenberg, 2013), 
this cannot explain the results of the other studies.  
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One limitation to the current results was the exclusive reliance on Amazon 
Mechanical Turk samples. Although such samples target people from all walks of life 
and are therefore less unrepresentative than typical college student samples (Berinsky, 
Huber, & Lenz, 2012; Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Mason & Suri, 2011), 
replication of these results in a representative sample would be welcome. We did 
solve one of the most important concerns with MTurk samples, reduced naivety 
(Chandler, Pe’er, Paolacci, Mueller, & Ratliff, 2015), by disallowing participation in 
more than one study. 
Implications 
When differences between political groups or stimuli are large and real, 
drawing sharper political clusters and categories can increase the efficient use of 
cognitive resources, allowing people on the political extremes to draw inferences 
more quickly than the politically moderate (Bruner, 1957; Allport, 1954). On the 
other hand, it may lead people to exaggerate differences between categories and thus 
introduce oversimplified and erroneous thinking about a complex and multifaceted 
world (Allport, 1954; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Park & Judd, 2005). This explains why 
liberals and conservatives in the United States find it so difficult to connect. People on 
the political extremes may not only miss opportunities to connect across the partisan 
divide because of negative emotions or lack of motivation, but also because in their 
perception of political reality there simply is no middle ground. In a reality that is 
characterized by growing polarization and a need for political nuance, awareness of 
such effects is of crucial importance (Haidt, 2012). If people with different political 
opinions are to live together in the same society, then they need to be able to perceive 
and understand the finer distinctions of their own and opposing political ideologies. If 
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instead people see reality in black and white terms, then this can only lead to 
unproductive and uncivil disagreement. 
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